The Kids Are All Right: Follow-up

My post on the relationship between ideology and fertility rates generated some great feedback and critiques (albeit mostly on a Facebook thread). Sadly, none of this was related to the awesome pun in the title of the piece. (Seriously, no love for “The Kids Are All Right”?)

Well, life goes on.

In light of the interest in the subject, I’ve decided to do a quick follow-up piece to address some readers’ questions and adding a bit of information, particularly as relates to this graph from the original post:

Conservative have more kids

1. Are there more people on the political left?

A couple people asked about the ideological composition of the nation and the sample I used. This is an important question, because if the political right makes up a small enough minority of the population or sample, then my graph, which shows the average number of children per respondents of different ideologies but doesn’t convey sample sizes, is a bit misleading—or at least less compelling. So my fault for not going into it in the first place.

Per the most recent polling by Gallup, The American electorate identifies as roughly 26% liberal, 35% moderate, and 35% conservative. This is after two decades of a slow, steady increase in the percentage of Americans calling themselves “liberal.” More on that later.

The sample I pulled from the General Social Survey (GSS) reflects Gallup’s national numbers pretty well: out of the total 8,539 respondents sampled, 2,346 (27.47%) identified as some degree of liberal, 3,285 (38.47%) as moderate, and 2,908 (34.50%) as some degree of conservative.

sample distribution

2. Are there more women on the political left?

I believe this question is getting at the same idea: if the majority of women are left of moderate, then the higher fertility of women on the right is less consequential for the electorate. According to Gallup’s national numbers, 30% of women identify as liberals—the same percentage as call themselves conservatives. For men, those numbers are notably different: 40% and 21%, respectively.

The sample I used showed more gender parity in ideologies, but it’s not hugely off. At any rate, the important thing is that the elevated fertility rates of conservative women can’t be written off as the effect of a small sample size.

men and women political ideologies

3. But the population has been getting more liberal. Doesn’t that kind of throw a wrench in this narrative?

Only time will tell, I suppose! To be clear, this is how many people read the tea leaves, and the story I’m telling is a bit of heterodoxy. While I can’t offer a firm answer to this question now, I have a few remarks:

  • The past is no guarantee of the future. (Ask GE shareholders, amirite?) Just because the electorate has been getting more liberal doesn’t mean it will continue to.
  • I suspect the secular trend toward liberalization is as influenced by macroeconomics and sociological factors as it is individual characteristics and experiences. The question is, what will be the effects of today’s macroeconomic and sociological upheaval on future voters—or their children?
  • Relatedly, I think time horizon matters a great deal when evaluating whether or not the future looks liberal or conservative. This is theory on my part, but maybe populations naturally move to the right over the long term (because conservatives reproduce more) unless cultural forces pulling leftward—economic globalization?—are sufficiently strong and sustained.
  • Finally, I think it’s worth noting that America’s liberal ranks are mostly swelling at the expense of its moderate contingent, perhaps due to increasing political polarization.

americans becoming more liberal
America has been getting more liberal at the expense of its moderate contingent

*

There were a few questions brought up to which I don’t have good answers at the moment. Without promising when, if at all, to address them—I’ve learned not to make firm commitments relating to this fine blog—here are two excellent threads I should follow:

  • Does completing various life milestones (having children, buying a house, getting married) make people more conservative? There must be some longitudinal studies on this somewhere…
  • To what extent do children’s political views match their parents’, and is there symmetry between liberals and conservatives in this regard? (I linked to one study by Gallup in the last post that suggested a 70% match between parents and their children, but there’s probably a lot more work on this out there.)
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Political Polarization Isn’t All Terrible

Political polarization, it is said, is tearing this country apart. As politics creeps into everything, it can seem like America is increasingly becoming a battleground for liberals and conservatives, while a shrinking moderate majority suffers the collateral damage.

Witness the left-wing condemnation of Taylor Swift’s insufficiently anti-Trump stance or the right-wing’s sudden loathing for the NFL and it will seem childish. Consider that 45% of Republicans and 41% of Democrats now believe the other party is a danger to the country and it appears nothing short of malignant. Recall the recent politically motivated shooting of Republican legislators in June, and you will conclude it is downright terminal.

But in many ways, polarization is the unhappy consequence of the increased choice enjoyed by media consumers and voters — things that most would probably consider to be not only good, but essential to a healthy democracy. Like many unpopular-but-ubiquitous phenomena, polarization serves many important functions. First, and probably most importantly, polarization helps simplify an otherwise complicated question: for whom should we vote?

Often, votes are cast from a position economists refer to as rational ignorance – a situation in which the costs of educating oneself (in this case about the various candidates and issues) outweigh the benefits. In other words, since a single vote has next to no impact in a high-turnout election, most voters will rationally avoid spending too much energy diving into the nuts and bolts of candidates’ proposals. With distinct parties, one can vote for the candidate of one party or the other and, even without familiarizing himself with every position held by that candidate, have a reasonably good idea of what the person he’s voting for believes.

Voters, thus, know more or less what they’re getting themselves into when they head to the polls. Want a bigger government? Vote Democrat. Lower taxes? Vote Republican. In a completely unpolarized political landscape, the barriers to informed voting would be even larger than they are now. Voters might get discouraged and abstain or vote based on something other than policy.

Speaking of voter engagement, political polarization is theorized to help with that, too. Recent research has shown that high levels of polarization, coupled with the presence of few political parties, encourage more people to vote. Findings from the Pew Center’s 2014  study of polarization in the American public further support this conclusion: individuals at the edges of the political spectrum are shown to be most likely to say they always vote. Animus toward the opposite party appears to be a major motivating factor for such voters.

This increased passion seems to extend beyond voting as well. Voters with consistent liberal or conservative views are about twice as likely as those with mixed views to engage in  various forms of political activism. As polarization has increased, so too has the percentage of voters saying they’ve spoken to others trying to persuade them to vote for one candidate or another, according to data collected by the  American National Election Studies. However strong one’s distaste for the current tone of civil discourse, its presence is better than the alternative.

A final positive consequence of polarization is that it slows down the government. If you are a partisan with an agenda and opportunity, you probably don’t think that’s such a great thing: a year ago, liberals were heaping opprobrium upon a Republican Congress for obstructionism; now the president is leveling the  same accusation against Democrats. But once your party’s out of power, you might be a little more sympathetic to the idea that governments should move with deliberation and humility rather than speed and zeal.

Of course there really are things that require governments to move quickly and with decisiveness, and when polarization impedes that process, that can be bad. But through opposition and gridlock, minority party members perform the valuable public service of making sure the governing party does not do too much too fast. The public only has so many meaningful opportunities for input, and having trillion-dollar commitments met with some resistance until voters get to weigh in again isn’t the worst thing in the world.

All this isn’t to say that political polarization is a fundamentally good thing. It is very often tiring, unproductive, and petulant. As a self-styled moderate and small-L libertarian, I can attest to my personal dissatisfaction with the candidates, policies, and discourse produced by our two-party system. There are things we can, and in my opinion maybe should, do to foster a political system less inclined to bipolarity. But in the short-term, we have the politics we have, and it’s worth realizing that polarization is not only a consequence of but also a conduit for many of the things that are good about our system of government.

This article originally appeared on Merion West

Does Portland’s CEO Tax Indicate Progressive Shift to Local Focus?

Starting next year, publicly traded companies operating in Portland, OR will be subject to a new tax surcharge if their CEOs are compensated at a rate exceeding 100 times that of their median employee. Per a Dodd-Frank regulation approved in 2015, public companies must disclose details of CEO and worker compensation beginning in 2017.

Such companies will have to pay an additional 10% to the existing business income tax owed to the city, calculated as 2.2% of their net income less operating losses. Companies whose CEOs earn over 250 times more than their median employee will have to pay a 25% surcharge.

Officials from the city estimate the new tax will apply to about 550 companies and provide between $2.5 million and $3.5 million in new revenue to the city’s general fund, which funds basic public services.

The new measure is the first of its kind; proponents are describing it as an innovative step in countering growing income inequality–one that they hope other cities will adopt. Skeptics of the new tax, most notably the Portland Business Alliance, say  it won’t reduce income inequality and that the city government should instead try to work with local businesses to boost job growth.

Both parties have good points. In isolation, the surcharge isn’t likely to do much in the way of reducing inequality. For starters, under the new SEC law corporations are given wide latitude to calculate median worker earnings (it’s more difficult than it sounds when you have workers in multiple countries with varying types of employment). More practically, large corporations with highly compensated executives do relatively little of their business in Portland. The city, to its credit, seems to understand this and isn’t eager to overplay its hand, hence the relatively small amount of revenue being raised by the tax.

But if enough cities adopted laws penalizing high CEO-worker compensation ratios, it could conceivably make a big enough dent in corporate profits to spur a change (though this might look substantially different from what lawmakers envision).

That seems to be exactly what Portland’s government hopes to catalyze. “It falls to cities to do creative, progressive policymaking,” Mayor Charlie Hales said, “and this is exactly what this is.” The real story here might not be a change to Portland’s tax code, but instead a change to the arenas in which progressive politicians choose to fight for their policies.

Faced with a Republican-dominated federal (and in some cases, state) government, large cities, which overwhelmingly tend to elect Democratic leadership, could increasingly take it upon themselves to implement the changes that elude them on the national level.

In cases where progressives advocate for the expansion of existing laws, they could find it easier to achieve such policy at the local level. This is for two reasons: First, the politics and economics are more likely to align; second, doing so is largely consistent with our system of federalism that allows for local expansion of federal law.

Consider that many large cities have seen fit to implement minimum wages that exceed the levels set by the states in which they reside, which often themselves exceed the $7.25/hour wage set by the federal government.

Focusing on advancing progressive policy at the city level should, in theory, mollify conservative opposition that has long stressed the importance of local governance. However this doesn’t necessarily appear to be the case: two days after Birmingham raised its minimum wage to $10.10/hour, the state of Alabama passed a law retroactively denying cities and towns within the state the ability to set their own minimum wages. The law is being contested in court.